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The Paradox of Source Credibility in Canadian and U.S. 
Domestic Counterterrorism Communications 
 
PATRICK BELANGER 
California State University, Monterey Bay, USA 
 
SUSAN SZMANIA 
University of Maryland, USA 
 
This article examines the interface of rhetorical theories of credibility and the domestic 
counterterrorism communications of government and nongovernment actors in Canada 
and the United States. We track evolving attempts to controvert terrorists’ propaganda 
through official and unofficial channels. Each country has a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy that employs both deterrence and “soft” approaches, such as 
diplomacy and engagement. Our focus is the latter. First, we discuss how governments 
undertook counterterrorism communications following September 2001. Second, we 
explore attempts to engage credible voices outside of government, such as former 
violent extremists and religious leaders, in the fight against terrorism. We conclude that 
although counterterrorism messaging must negotiate the challenge of source credibility, 
further examination of elements such as context, audience reception, and digital 
engagement is needed to refine domestic campaigns launched by government and civil 
society actors.  
 
Keywords: credibility, counterterrorism, extremism, deradicalization, formers, religious 
leaders, rhetoric, soft power 
 
 
Public officials acknowledge the inherent difficulties of developing and deploying credible 
counterterrorism messaging. Speaking at the January 2018 Internet policy conference State of the Net, in 
Washington, DC, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke acknowledged the limited role that 
government plays in pushing back on online terrorist propaganda through messaging campaigns. Duke 
stated, “The truth is the government doesn’t have great credibility in the online space, for good 
reasons. . . . We are too old, too big, and too square” (State of the Net, 2018, Min 11:01). Yet Duke also 
recognized that government, together with private sector and community partners, must continue to 
address the evolving terrorist threat through counter and alternative messaging. 
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This article explores the seeming paradox of projecting credibility through counterterrorism 
communications in Canada and the United States. On one hand, both countries’ government agencies are 
charged with ensuring the safety and security of citizens. Their messages are intended to provide safety 
information and reassure the public about security issues. In the United States, the well-known “If You 
See Something, Say Something” campaign serves as an example of one way to encourage the public to 
report possible threat incidents, including potential acts of terrorism.1 In Canada, the National Security 
Information Network is a telephone hotline for Canadians to report safety and security concerns that do 
not pose an immediate threat.2 On the other hand, each government’s ability to speak credibly is 
sometimes called into question. The U.S. Department of State, for example, launched a controversial 
attempt to push back on online terrorist messages, including from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) and other international terrorist groups, with the Center for Counterterrorism Communications’ 
“Think Again, Turn Away Campaign.”3 Researcher Rita Katz (2014) observed that online engagement 
between government representatives and terrorists (or supporters) was not only “counterproductive” but 
also came close to crossing “dangerous ethical lines” (para. 14) when, in some instances, U.S. officials 
communicated directly with leaders of a terrorist group. Another State Department effort to create a video 
parody of terrorist propaganda received harsh criticism for “playing into the Islamic State’s hands by 
bolstering its reputation for cruelty and expanding its audience” (Miller & Higham, 2015, “Inspired by 
Monty Python,” para. 13). Highlighting the paradox of government messaging and source credibility, 
government actors must at times present themselves “not as current government spokespersons but as 
independent voices” (Riley & Hollihan, 2012, p. 72). 
 
To investigate the paradox of source credibility in more depth, we examine the extent to which 
rhetorical theories of message and source credibility align with the counterterrorism communications of 
government and civil society actors in Canada and the United States. These two countries provide a useful 
lens through which to view evolving attempts at countering terrorists’ propaganda through official and 
unofficial channels. In recent years, both countries have reported an increasing number of individuals 
attempting to join or provide support to ISIS. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service indicates that 
approximately 190 Canadian persons are suspected of terrorist activity aboard. The breakdown of 
membership is uncertain.4 In the United States, government agencies publicly estimate that 250 
individuals have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to join ISIS.5 Both governments have proposed 
that counterextremist communications might effectively address this issue, and both countries have 
framed their counterterrorism engagements on a model of partnerships between public and private 
                                               
1  See https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something  
2  http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/national-security-information-network  
3 The Center for Counterterrorism Communications was renamed the Global Engagement Center by 
Executive Order 13721 on March 14, 2016 (https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/03/17/2016-
06250/developing-an-integrated-global-engagement-center-to-support-government-wide-counterterrorism). 
4 See https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pblc-rprt-trrrst-thrt-cnd-2017/pblc-rprt-trrrst-thrt-cnd-
2017-en.pdf; http://www.macleans.ca/news/number-of-canadian-fighters-in-syria-iraq-levelling-off-csis/  
5 For further discussion, see 
https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Involvement_in_Violent_Extremism
_2015.pdf  
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sectors (see Government of Canada, 2013; White House, 2011). Moreover, both countries have developed 
their counterterrorism messaging approaches over the 16 years since 9/11. The article proceeds in three 
steps. We (1) trace the application of soft power, (2) outline the use of formers, and (3) explore the 
potential of a community-driven religious response. With respect to this last point, we examine a 2015 
anti-ISIS fatwa published by the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada. To establish context for the fatwa, 
the first author interviewed a respected Canadian imam. The article concludes with several theory-based 
recommendations for future domestic counterterrorism communications.  
 
Counterterrorism Communications as National Security Strategy 
 
Western governments have paid increasing attention to the need to win the so-called battle for 
hearts and minds as part of a comprehensive national security posture. This approach evolved in the years 
following the September 11, 2001, al-Qa’ida attacks in the United States. To be sure, the immediate 
reaction of the United States and its allies focused heavily on military solutions. However, over time, this 
military orientation evolved beyond the battlefield to include engagement, prevention and strategic 
communications approaches, often with Muslim communities at home and abroad.  
 
Theories of soft power, “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through 
attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2008, p. 94), developed in this context and have 
figured into national policies addressing terrorism and security. Soft power suggests that in a complex 
global environment, strategic communication entails “a contest of competitive credibility” (p. 100), and 
that a target individual is more easily brought into alignment with desired beliefs if she or he identifies 
with a rhetor’s narrative and corresponding actions. This is rarely straightforward. A broad scholarly 
literature engages the idea of strategic communication (e.g., Corman, Trethewey, & Goodall, 2008; 
Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007; Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2014; Zaharna, 
2010). Patricia Riley and Thomas Hollihan (2012, p. 62) have identified challenges associated with appeals 
to multiple audiences (with conflicting goals), and suggest that strategic communication may require 
creative application of diverse forms: speeches, press conferences, interviews, visits, engagements, media 
campaigns, and tactical leaks. Crucially, because of its unpredictability, social media constitutes a unique 
challenge to message coherence.  
 
This said, the use of soft power within a counterterrorism context can be seen in how Canada and 
the United States engaged Muslim communities in the years after 9/11. For instance, the 2002 U.S. 
National Security Strategy released by the Bush Administration recognized the need for deeper 
engagement with “the Muslim world . . . to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote 
terrorism do not find fertile ground” (U.S. Department of State, 2002, “Strengthen alliances,” para. 8). 
Although the thrust of this engagement was primarily directed toward communities abroad, the U.S. and 
Canadian governments also initiated incremental efforts to engage domestic Muslim (and other minority) 
communities. In 2004, Canada developed cross-cultural roundtable events with “ethno-cultural and 
religious communities . . . to engage in a long-term dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage 
security interests in a diverse society” (Government of Canada, 2004, p. 2).  
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The U.S. government has also addressed the concern that counterterrorism programs unfairly 
target Muslim Americans. In 2007, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff 
met with influential Muslim Americans to discuss ways in which the department could work with U.S. 
Muslim communities. Following this meeting, the DHS disseminated a list of recommendations regarding 
optimal terminology to use when describing the terrorist threat and for engaging Muslim communities.6  
 
More broadly, U.S. interaction with the Muslim world took the form of international diplomacy. 
Shortly after his election, President Obama traveled to Egypt in June 2009 and gave a speech that is 
generally considered the defining “reset” for U.S. relations with the Muslim world. Speaking at Cairo 
University, the President declared:  
 
I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims 
around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based 
upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. 
(Obama, 2009, para. 5) 
 
Noting that the impacts of globalization “led many Muslims to view the West as hostile to the 
traditions of Islam [and] violent extremists have exploited these tensions” (Obama, 2009, para. 34), 
Obama declared, “Islam is not part of the problem in combating violent extremism—it is an important part 
of promoting peace” (para. 21). Whether or not one interprets these words as sincere, the speech 
indicated an attempt to reframe the relationship between the U.S. government and Muslim populations. A 
2016 report by the Homeland Security Advisory Council on countering violent extremism continued this 
pattern. Emphasizing that “tone and word choice matter” (p. 12), the report recommended that federal 
agencies use the phrase American Muslims, not Muslim Americans.  
 
It is worth noting that U.S. policy has shifted on this issue. In a break from the Obama 
administration, the incoming Trump administration focused federal attention on Islamic extremism (see 
Köhler & Miller-Idriss, 2017). The December 2017 National Security Strategy (White House, 2017) affirms 
that terrorism prevention activities remain a national security priority. The document calls for improved 
trust between law enforcement, the private sector, and U.S. citizens, and explicitly states that national 
security experts will “work with law enforcement and civic leaders on terrorism prevention” and provide 
“accurate and actionable information about radicalization in their communities” (White House, 2017, p. 
11). Administration officials continue to recognize multiple forms of extremism, including violence enacted 
by domestic anarchists and racial supremacists. However, both the National Security Strategy and 
government officials emphasize that the greatest international threat comes from “violent global jihadist 
groups” (DHS, 2017, para. 11).  
 
Some critics have denounced the emphasis on “terrorism prevention” and suggested that the 
shift away from the broader issue of violent extremism may increase suspicion and marginalization, 
especially within Muslim communities, and lead to less trust between law enforcement and 
communities. However, experts also suggest that the current environment may offer unexpected 
                                               
6 See https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_crcl_terminology_08-1-08_accessible.pdf  
International Journal of Communication 12(2018)  The Paradox of Source Credibility  1463 
opportunities to “build an ecosystem independent of the federal government” (Rosand & Meserole, 2017, 
para. 11) to address radicalization and recruitment by putting local communities in charge of prevention 
efforts, taking a broader approach to extremist threats, and engaging the private sector more robustly. 
 
In the post-9/11 era, Canada and the United States also recognized the need to address terrorist 
propaganda online. These efforts came in response to incidents in which terror groups began recruiting 
individuals in Canada and the United States through digital platforms. In Canada, the Internet factored 
prominently into a 2006 plot by 18 individuals to bomb prominent landmarks in Toronto. Investigators 
found that members of the group were inspired by online propaganda (Desjardins, 2014, para. 4). 
 
To address the evolving digital landscape, Western governments began to focus counterterrorism 
efforts under the rubric of “countering violent extremism,” or CVE. In the United States, the prevention-
based CVE strategy is articulated in the 2011 document Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States. Beyond stating the need for a community-based approach to security, the 
document also calls for countering extremist propaganda, including “narratives that feed on grievances, 
assign blame, and legitimize the use of violence” (White House, 2011, p. 6). Similarly, the Government of 
Canada’s (2013) Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy provides a 
comprehensive assessment of national security concerns. The strategy outlines a four-pronged approach 
for addressing the terrorist threat: (1) preventing violence, (2) detecting plots, (3) denying the means and 
opportunities to pursue terrorist activities, and (4) developing the ability to respond to terrorism 
“proportionally [and] rapidly” (p. 3). The document recognizes that the Internet is “a significant forum for 
violent extremist communication and coordination” (p. 16), and calls for “positive alternative narratives 
that emphasize the open, diverse and inclusive nature of Canadian society” (pp. 16–17). Overall, the 
recommendation is to create messages that “resonate more strongly than terrorist propaganda” (p. 17). 
 
The importance of addressing online aspects of terrorists’ influence has expanded in the age of 
ISIS. The group’s online presence and ability to mobilize and recruit individuals via the Web has been well 
documented (e.g., Stern & Berger, 2015a, 2015b). With the rise of ISIS and its media production arm known 
as Al Hayat Media Center, there has been increased attention on terrorist propaganda online, its function in 
the radicalization and recruitment process, and, importantly, growing discussions about how governments 
and communities might counter digital propaganda (Neumann, 2013; Stern & Berger, 2015b).  
 
As the Government of Canada recognized in its 2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to 
Canada, ISIS members “provid[e] online guidance and direction to would-be attackers in the West” 
(Government of Canada, 2016, p. 16). Similarly, a report by the University of Maryland’s National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (n.d.) found that 86% of more than 
200 U.S.-based foreign fighters’ profiles examined since 2005 had “used the internet to view extremist 
materials, research conflicts, groups, and attack methods, and participate in online communities of like-
minded individuals” (p. 2).  
 
Yet, despite the fact that both Canada and the United States recognize the central role of the 
Internet in the process of radicalization to violence, neither governments’ domestic CVE efforts make 
comprehensive use of Web-based counterterrorism communications. In some cases, these governments 
1464  Patrick Belanger and Susan Szmania International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
are limited by “legal barriers that currently make many former violent extremists reticent to speak out” 
(Institute for Strategic Dialogue, n.d., p. 7). To be sure, the United States has developed messaging 
approaches through the Department of State as well as Department of Defense projects, although these 
projects have been restricted domestically because of concerns about disseminating propaganda to U.S. 
citizens (e.g., Sager, 2015). The following sections illustrate how domestic Canadian and U.S. 
counterterrorism communications programs have often prioritized nongovernment actors’ denunciations of 
terrorist actions.  
 
Rhetorical Credibility and Counterterrorism Messaging 
 
Rhetorical credibility cuts across various disciplines. Public relations research has drawn on 
theories of branding, reputation, identity, loyalty, and image management (van Ham, 2002, p. 255). 
Health communication research has examined the challenges posed by antivaccination campaigns, 
wherein “the credibility of an information source may serve as a cue to discount or augment the 
communicated message” (Haase, Betsch, & Renkewitz, 2015, p. 920). Thomas Hollihan and Kevin Baaske 
(2015) define rhetorical credibility as both an “audience’s assessment of the competence and 
trustworthiness of the source” (p. 129) as well as the “source credibility and integrity that contributes to 
the persuasiveness of an argumentative claim” (p. 354). In other words, rhetorical credibility is premised 
on careful attention to a number of dimensions related to the speaker, message, and audience. These 
elements combine to persuade and ultimately to inform action. As outlined below, several 
countermessaging strategies have attempted to bolster rhetorical credibility through engagement with 
former members of extremist groups and prominent religious leaders.  
 
Formers 
 
In the arena of counterterrorism communication, government officials often acknowledge the 
necessity and challenges of achieving messaging credibility. One element involves source or “extrinsic” 
credibility. Governments may be perceived as credible messengers on some issues, but less credible on 
others. As such, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (2009), a platform for policy makers and 
practitioners, notes:  
 
Former violent extremists who come from certain settings have innate credibility and 
can relate to at risk youth who may be in similar situations as they once were. Victims of 
terrorism also have innate credibility because they are a testament to the violence, 
trauma, and suffering that terrorism can wreak. (p. 5) 
 
Governments have established efforts to work with former extremists and parents of children who have 
joined ISIS. One example is the Extreme Dialogue project (“About Extreme Dialogue,” 2018), launched in 
Canada in 2015 and partially funded by Public Safety Canada (equivalent to the U.S. DHS). The project 
aims to “build resilience to radicalisation among young people [by fostering] critical thinking and digital 
literacy skills” (para. 1). Central to the platform are documentary films that detail personal stories of two 
Canadians affected by violent extremism: one a former member of an extreme far-right movement, and a 
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mother whose son was killed fighting for ISIS in Syria.7 These films are supplemented with resources 
designed for classroom or community education.  
 
Certainly, marketing strategies for various public health and safety initiatives have drawn on the 
assumption that “formers” make credible messengers. This suggestion is frequently made by terrorism 
policy analysts, suggesting that a “key tactic” in the counter-ISIS campaign should be to make use of 
those who have left ISIS and “who are disillusioned by its ideology” (Olidort & Sheff, 2016, para. 7; see 
also Samuel, 2015, p. 95). This approach of using real stories from individuals with experience is a tactic 
well known in the public health arena, where government-sponsored antismoking campaigns with “tips 
from former smokers”8 intend to expose the negative long-term health consequences of tobacco and 
cigarette smoking.  
 
This tactic of ISIS defectors promoting a public counternarrative can be seen in the example of 
“Mo,” a 27-year-old American citizen who traveled to Syria to join the terror group in 2014. Hoping to find 
paradise for Muslims, Mo reported that he found only destruction and violence in ISIS-controlled territory. 
Speaking publicly with NBC News in a May 2016 nationally broadcast video, in cooperation with federal 
authorities, Mo said, “The Islamic State is not bringing Islam to the world, and people need to know that” 
(Engel, Plesser, & Connor, 2016, para. 9). The aim of disseminating such messages is to dissuade others 
from similar decisions (e.g., 19-year-old Mohammed Hamzah Khan of Illinois, who after his arrest for 
attempting to join ISIS told the Federal Bureau of Investigation that he hoped to participate in “a public-
service role” in Syria to help other Muslims; Reitman, 2015). 
 
From a rhetorical perspective, countermessaging such as the Extreme Dialogue project rests on 
the premise that formers may achieve inherent source credibility for specific audiences. In the examples 
above, Mo’s description of the shortcomings he found with ISIS’s message could potentially be persuasive 
to someone like Mohammed Hamzah Khan because of Mo’s experience traveling to ISIS-controlled 
territory. Eugene Garver (2004), for instance, has argued that conviction derives from a speaker’s 
credibility (pp. 6–7). In 1953, Hovland, Janis, and Kelly defined credibility as the result of perceived 
intentions, expertise, and trustworthiness. More recently Charles Larson (2010) identified several key 
elements of credibility: expertise, trustworthiness, dynamism, charisma, and image (pp. 247–249). 
Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (2001) have also foregrounded the importance of perceived authority, 
established via “institutional certification” (p. 15).  
 
Crucially, a source’s credibility will often outweigh internal deficiencies or contradictions in 
supporting evidence (Zarefsky, 2007, p. 298). This is particularly relevant in the digital age wherein many 
people inhabit virtual echo chambers structured by filtered, self-reinforcing information. As individuals 
access information that reaffirms existing viewpoints, society may fragment into niche groups. And as 
people gain confidence due to corroboration, beliefs become entrenched (Sunstein, 2007). This insulation 
may prevent individuals from hearing alternative perspectives, which in the context of terrorism can lead 
                                               
7 Another project that highlights the use of both “formers” and “victims” is the Against Violent Extremism 
Network (http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/).  
8 See http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/  
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to extremism or a “radicalization echo chamber” (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, p. 21). Crucially, insulation that 
may influence an individual’s radicalization trajectory may also reduce a radicalized individual’s willingness 
and/or ability to hear appeals from government-supported programs, such as the Extreme Dialogue 
project, or publicly broadcast messages from formers like Mo.  
 
Highlighting the role of evidence in health campaigns, Dale Hample and Jennifer Hample (2014) 
call attention to the importance of “intrinsic” (evidence-based) credibility that can significantly affect 
attitudes (p. 26). Yet messages must address humans “with complex minds [sometimes] beyond the 
reach of even the most rigorous logic” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 232). Even with access to optimal (accurate and 
contextualized) information, individuals may not engage in rational discussion, form collective opinions, 
and communicate these desires to responsive government bodies (Habermas, 1991). Successful 
communication often encourages an audience’s emotional identification with institutions, values, and 
ideas. Building on an audience’s shared beliefs, a rhetor may amplify and capitalize on preexisting notions 
of community. 
 
Returning to the examples of how formers have engaged Canadian and U.S. society through 
small dialogue events or via the mass media, it is important to emphasize that a speaker’s credibility (or 
lack thereof) is ultimately judged by an audience. There is not yet clear evidence on the efficacy of either 
the Extreme Dialogue Project or the media events centered around Mo’s story, and it is difficult to know 
whether a former’s credibility is persuasive to broad audiences or even to those few people considering 
terrorist actions. To date, research on the use of formers in the deradicalization process has shown limited 
but promising outcomes in one-on-one online intervention efforts9 and when using formers as mentors in 
a disengagement program for violent white supremacists (Christensen, 2015). Nonetheless, the Canadian 
and U.S. approaches to counterterrorism messaging have attempted to address deficiencies in each 
government’s perceived lack of extrinsic credibility by injecting the voices of formers into larger public 
conversations about violent extremism.  
 
Religious Response 
 
Terrorist propaganda often appeals to an individual’s desire to achieve meaning and purpose in 
his or her life, whether through religious identification or a sense of personal superiority (Kruglanski & 
Orehek, 2011). Criminologist Garth Davies (phone conversation, 2015) emphasizes the importance of 
social-psychological factors in the radicalization process. Although acknowledging that some individuals 
drawn to ISIS would meet the standards of religiously devout fanatics, Davies suggests that it would be 
inaccurate to conflate this subset with the whole. In the language of Benedict Anderson (2006), all people 
identify as part of an “imagined community” (p. 25). All people identify with a grand narrative, and strive 
for dignity and esteem via a set of social networks that foster a sense of belonging. Youth radicalization 
researcher Amy Thornton (as cited in Perreaux & Stevenson, 2015) at University College London affirms 
the importance of belonging as a core feature of terrorist propaganda. Noting that gangs, cults, sports 
teams, and the military all recruit based on youths’ desire to belong to a greater cause, she states, “Young 
people are looking for a narrative to their lives. They are looking for a transcendental justification” (para. 
                                               
9 See http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/One2One_Web_v9.pdf  
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37). Researcher Jytte Klausen (2015) has shown through analysis of ISIS members’ images posted on 
Twitter that “the most graphic pictures send a message of unconstrained power” (p. 13). Lorne Dawson 
and Amarnath Amarasingam (2017) affirm the importance of narrative in a study based on 20 interviews 
with foreign fighters in Syria. Acknowledging multiple factors that influence radicalization to violence, the 
authors suggest that low social and economic prospects are rarely a prime motivating force—rather, more 
attention should be given to existential concerns and the role of religion. 
 
Numerous governments have collaboratively explored how societies can respond to terrorism, 
and have highlighted the centrality of religion. The Global Counterterrorism Forum (n.d.), for instance, has 
recommended including a variety of community and religious leaders in activities to promote tolerance 
and inclusiveness. Aligned with this framework, the governments of Canada and the United States have 
gone beyond the use of formers to identify religious leaders as potentially credible messengers in the fight 
against terrorism. RAND researchers Helmus, York, and Chalk (2013), citing the White House (2011), 
assert that “the most effective, potent, and credible messages against al-Qa’ida and other Muslim 
extremist groups will rise from within the American Muslim community” (p. 1). They suggest that religious 
leaders have elevated credibility because of their abilities “to address thorny and complex issues of 
religious ideology” (p. 1).10  
 
In the United States, for instance, government messaging about and/or interpretation of religious 
texts is severely limited by the Establishment Clause that prohibits governmental privileging of one 
religion over another. Research associated with Public Safety Canada has specifically called on 
government to support development of “alternative narratives” that do not  
 
challenge extremist messaging directly, but instead attempt to influence those who 
might be sympathetic toward (but not actively supportive of) extremist causes, or help 
to unite the silent majority against extremism by emphasizing solidarity, common 
causes and shared values. (Briggs & Feve, 2014, section 5.2)  
 
This approach skirts direct engagement on religious issues by broadening the discussion to topics more 
easily addressed by official sources.  
 
Beyond the challenge of government involvement in religious debates, research has shown that 
foreign policy actions may fuel grievances toward Western governments. For example, Islamic religious 
leaders point to the United States’ and United Kingdom’s invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), 
which contributed to a sense of isolation and distrust for many Muslims worldwide and may have “paved 
the way” for the rise of ISIS (Hussain, 2015). Moreover, these military actions may, “encourage the 
process of radicalization [by developing a] perception that there exists only one solution, extreme 
violence” (Pettinger, 2015, p. 92). David Kilcullen (2009) has further argued an explicit correlation 
between Western military operations and the exacerbation of local sentiment:  
 
                                               
10 For a discussion of charismatic authority and terrorist radicalization, see Hofmann and Dawson (2014).  
1468  Patrick Belanger and Susan Szmania International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
Most of the adversaries Western powers have been fighting since 9/11 . . . fight us not 
because they hate the West and seek our overthrow but because we have invaded their 
space to deal with a small extremist element that has manipulated and exploited local 
grievances to gain power in their societies. (p. 262) 
 
Desire to avenge perceived injustice is found in the example of John Maguire, a Canadian who 
converted to Islam and traveled to Syria to join ISIS in 2013. In response to the Canadian government’s 
participation in an international military coalition fighting against ISIS, Maguire urged other Canadian 
Muslims to take arms “in retaliation to . . . unprovoked acts of aggression” (Bell, 2014, para. 15), and 
stated in a propaganda video: “The more bombs you drop on our people, the more Muslims will realize 
[that] waging jihad against the West [is] a religious obligation” (para. 11). 
 
Given that the domestic approaches of the United States and Canada have focused on 
empowering credible voices within Muslim communities to speak out against extremism, it is worth 
highlighting the response of one religious group, the Fiqh Council of North America (2015), to the 
December 2015 San Bernardino shootings. In an online condemnation of the event, Executive Director Dr. 
Zulfiqar Ali Shah stated:  
 
Those who commit acts of violence, cruelty and terror in the name of Islam are not only 
destroying innocent lives but are also betraying the very faith they claim to protect. No 
injustice done to Muslims can ever justify the massacre of innocent people, and no act of 
terror will ever serve the cause of Islam. . . . We refuse to allow our faith to be held 
hostage by the criminal actions of a small minority acting outside the teachings of both 
the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. We remind all Muslims that 
loyalty to one’s homeland and compassion to one’s neighbors is an integral part of the 
Islamic faith. (para. 1)  
 
Another, more sweeping example of a religious response to Islamic terrorism comes from the 
Calgary-based organization Muslims Against Terrorism (MAT). In March 2015, MAT founder Imam Syed 
Soharwardy initiated an anti-ISIS fatwa, the first Canadian instance, and one signed by 38 Canadian 
imams and Islamic scholars. The Islamic Supreme Council of Canada’s (2015) text declares:  
 
We, the undersigned Imams, strongly disagree and condemn those policies of the United 
States, Canada and other Western countries in the Middle East which are completely 
unjust, based upon Islamophobia, bias and intolerance towards Muslims. We also 
understand and condemn the highly destructive and hateful role of the media in 
intentionally promoting intolerance towards Islam and Muslims. However, in order to 
counter the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim efforts, a Muslim cannot choose the path of ISIS 
or other terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, Taliban, Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, Al-
Nusrah, Lashkar Taiba, Lashkar Jhangwi, etc. (para. 21) 
 
Such pronouncements from Islamic organizations are important for several reasons. First, 
distinguishing individual terrorists from majority Muslim society, they may defend against Islamophobia. 
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Second, they may discourage radicalization of Muslim youth, and thereby support community-based 
efforts to combat Islamic extremism.. These two messages face different audiences, and there is no 
guarantee that a specific Islamic organization will have authority to speak to both. That said, as proposed 
by Alex Schmid (2015), research fellow at the International Counter-Terrorism Centre (The Hague), there 
is a pressing need for “credible Muslim opinion makers who interpret [religious] verses in their respective 
historical and political contexts” (p. 74). Although the fatwa’s language is direct, and of an intensity that 
would deter some Canadian citizens, this very anger might provide the fatwa (and its signatories) with 
sufficient credibility in other circles—specifically, Muslims vulnerable to ISIS’s extremist propaganda 
and/or charismatic champions of Islamic terrorist organizations. In other words, it is possible that, with 
respect to the small minority of Muslims at risk of radicalization, responses to extremist propaganda must 
come from voices/organizations with credibility derived from both Islamic authority and open criticism of 
Western foreign policy. If so, in its efforts to dissociate extremism and Islam, the Islamic Supreme Council 
of Canada holds a unique position in Canada’s public landscape.  
 
The fatwa’s language is particularly striking when contrasted with high-profile federal 
pronouncements. For example, unveiling Canada’s 2015 antiterrorism legislation, Prime Minister Harper 
(as cited in Leblanc & Hannay, 2017) evaded serious engagement with the possible causes of terrorism. In 
stating that “Canadians are targeted by these terrorists for no other reason than that we are Canadians” 
(para. 7), Harper offered a superficial explanation, one divorced from historical context. The fatwa (2015) 
explicitly does not advocate violence against Western countries; however, by directly condemning the 
“policies of the United States, Canada and other Western countries in the Middle East which are 
completely unjust [and] based upon Islamophobia” (para. 21), the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada 
offers one (historically contextualized) explanation for why some Islamic youth might be attracted to 
extremist ideas. And it is this very understanding of audience that bestows the fatwa with credibility, for 
certain key audiences, in the arena of counterterrorism communication.  
 
In a 2015 conversation with a respected Canadian imam, the first author asked about the fatwa’s 
scathing condemnation of Canada’s foreign policy. The individual emphasized that these views are 
accepted by a significant number of Canadians Muslims. Throughout the conversation, two central themes 
became apparent. First, regardless of intent, the Canadian military’s combat operations in Afghanistan 
encouraged some individuals to support extreme Islamic organizations. Further, the Harper government’s 
active lobbying against Palestine’s bid for a United Nations seat deepened the alienation of some Canadian 
Muslim youth. The Harper government is gone from power, but the lesson remains―federal actions can 
significantly affect public attitudes and perhaps situate individuals as receptive to either terrorist or 
antiterrorist messages. Second, language matters, including mass media depictions of Muslims and 
governmental characterizations of the battle against “Islamic extremism.” Efforts to clarify that Muslims 
are a diverse population, and that terrorism derives from extreme outlier groups, can diminish 
Islamophobia and reduce tension between Muslim youths’ religious and civic identities. As highlighted via 
a rhetorical recognition of audience, fatwas achieve a different audience than government statements. 
This point is simple but important.  
 
The fatwa (2015) continues to state that “there is very clear guidance in the holy Qur’an and in 
the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) clearly guiding Muslims on how to handle anti-
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Islam and anti-Muslim aggression on the part of groups and governments” (para. 22). Specifically 
forbidden are multiple acts routinely practiced by ISIS (e.g., killing Muslims, destroying mosques, 
murdering Islamic scholars, mutilating a human body alive or dead). Noting that ISIS/ISIL has committed 
multiple violations of Islamic law (paras. 23–24), the fatwa proceeds: 
 
We warn all Muslims, especially the youth, regarding the very deceptive un-Islamic, 
criminal nature of ISIS/ISIL OR Da’esh ( داعش ). This organization has recruited several 
Muslim youth, girls and boys, by deceiving them in the name of the Khilafah (Caliphate). 
Some Muslim youth from Western and Islamic countries have been misguided by 
ISIS/ISIL (Da’esh). We urge all of them to repent to Allah and leave ISIS/ISIL 
immediately. We, the undersigned Imams inform all Muslim youth, girls, boys and 
general public that: 
 
• Joining ISIS/ISIL and groups like ISIS/ISIL is HARAAM (forbidden) in Islam. 
• Any Muslim who joins these KHAWARIJ (ISIS/ISIL) groups actually disconnects and 
disassociates himself/herself from the Ummah of Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him). 
• Any Muslim who joins ISIS/ISIL OR similar groups disobeys Allah and His Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him). 
• And whosoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger (peace be upon him), and 
transgresses His limits, He will cast him into the Fire, to abide therein; and he shall 
have a disgraceful torment. (paras. 33–36)  
 
After drawing a clear disjuncture between Islam and ISIS, the cosignatories turn to more secular, 
civic concerns. The fatwa (2015) warns Muslim youth against “speeches, songs and the literature available 
on the Internet or on social media produced by the imposters pretending to be Muslims.” Because such 
sources are “a trap for young Muslims,” youth are advised to “visit their local mosques and discuss any 
questions or points of confusion with the Imam publicly” (para. 39). Making clear the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Canada’s position on terrorism, the text asserts that, “any person who inspires people to cause 
harm to Canada and Canadians must immediately be reported to the Police” (para. 39). 
 
A notable turn is made in framing such counterterrorism principles as “our Islamic duty” to protect 
the rights of Canada’s 1.1 million Muslims to practice their religion in safety and peace. Canada is home to  
 
more than 1000 mosques [and] more than 700 Islamic schools (madrasah) [and is a 
country where] large gatherings on Islam, Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) are freely and publicly held, and where every day several non-Muslim 
‘Canadians embrace Islam. (para. 39)  
 
The fatwa (2015) highlights that radicalization and support for ISIS threatens Muslims’ “freedom to 
practice Islam in Canada” (para. 39) including conversions to the faith. As such “any attack on Canada will 
be an attack on the freedom of Canadian Muslims. It is the duty of every Canadian Muslim to safeguard 
Canada” (para. 40). Particularly notable here is the direct appeal to Muslims’ self-interests. After 
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censuring Canadian policies in the Middle East region, as well as mainstream media portrayals of Muslims 
in general, the fatwa nonetheless acknowledges the religious freedoms broadly enjoyed Canadian Muslims. 
To support terrorist organizations such as ISIS, it asserts, is to put at risk the ability to exercise religious 
duties.  
 
These formal pronouncements come from religious leaders, but other voices also hold promise for 
specific audiences. For instance, a 2016 story in the fashion magazine Teen Vogue provides an example of 
how members of the Muslim community may amplify countermessaging in novel ways (Eaton, 2016). 
Joshua Eaton reports about a college student in Boulder, Colorado, who, when asked by a classmate why 
Muslims do not condemn terrorist acts, created a spreadsheet of thousands of instances where Muslim 
religious groups have denounced terrorism in the name of Islam. The project, which has now become a 
searchable Web platform called Muslims Condemn,11 allows users to find links to examples of Muslims who 
have spoken out against terrorism, such as the ISIS-linked 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, France, 
and the 2016 Orlando, Florida, shooting. This example underscores the fundamental importance of 
audience reception. Although religious leaders are knowledgeable about Islam, and thus ostensibly well-
situated to challenge terrorist messages that incite violence in the name of Islam, their messages do not 
always reach a wide audience or those most vulnerable to radicalization. Source credibility is potent, but it 
has rhetorical force only in relation to audience.  
 
The Role of Credibility in Counterterrorism Communication  
 
Counterterrorism messaging can have multiple objectives: to influence select opinion leaders, to 
appease a constituency, or to constitute community, to name but a few. To maximize impact, a rhetor must 
understand a target audience’s beliefs and motivations. Generally speaking, hostility and transparent 
persuasion have limited efficacy in that they spark defensiveness. More persuasive are appeals phrased in 
the language of shared aims that resonate with an audience’s experiences and values (Burke, 1969, p. 55).  
 
Thus far, we have explored the extent to which Canadian and U.S. domestic counterterrorism 
messages have aligned with basic principles of rhetorical credibility. To date, efforts have typically focused 
on engagement with either the Muslim community, as in the example of religious leaders speaking out 
against terrorist acts, or through messages from “formers” who engage broader audiences via mass 
media. In certain contexts, religious leaders may achieve credibility through their knowledge of religious 
texts and ability to translate that wisdom to real-life situations. In other contexts, former terrorists may 
speak credibly about their experiences and disillusionment. Following the assumption that certain 
individuals are more prone to extremist messages such as those of ISIS, it is both prudent and strategic 
to support voices and organizations that have the perceived credibility within key audiences to challenge 
those messages.  
 
Yet a fundamental challenge involves successfully reaching key audiences that may be 
susceptible to terrorists’ appeals. In early 2016, the U.S. Department of State launched the Global 
Engagement Center with the aim of reaching foreign audiences and developing “networks of governmental 
                                               
11 See https://muslimscondemn.com/  
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and non-governmental partners to . . . create, develop, and sustain effective positive alternative 
narratives” (Executive Order 13721, 2016, p. 14686). Joint regional efforts with support from the U.S. 
Department of State, such as the Sawab Center in the United Arab Emirates, take a similar approach.12 As 
we have noted, U.S. domestic counterterrorism messaging has been hampered by regulations prohibiting 
government messaging, such as the Smith–Mundt Act.13 However, we believe that, to the extent legally 
possible, more should be done to develop targeted digital approaches to engage domestic audiences via a 
broad range of potentially credible messengers. Indeed, at a micro scale, Williams, Horgan, and Evans 
(2016) report that friends of those radicalizing to violence may be best placed to notice concerning 
behavior, although they may be reluctant to report concerns to law enforcement authorities. And to be 
clear, communities play a vital role in any comprehensive CVE strategy. One promising illustration is 
outlined in Joosse, Bucerius, and Thompson’s (2015) exploration of the resilience of Somali youth in 
Toronto. Based on interviews with 118 members of Canada’s largest Somali community, the researchers 
found that Somali Canadians have established sophisticated counternarratives to counter the recruitment 
propaganda of al-Shabaab. 
 
Back at the national scale, the United Kingdom has found that there are serious challenges 
associated with developing a credible counterterrorism communication strategy. Beyond the overarching 
concern that community leaders who participate in these activities may be suspect of collusion with the 
government, some CVE programs risk alienating and stigmatizing Muslim communities in spite of public 
statements to the contrary (Awan, 2012; Thomas, 2010). Further, no single Muslim organization can claim 
to speak for or represent all Muslims, and, for those who do choose to speak up, serious safety risks may 
be incurred.  
 
For these reasons, it is vital to look beyond Islamic extremism to the much broader category of 
extremism.14 For instance, surveys of law enforcement officials in the United States have found that other 
types of violent extremism, such as antigovernment militia groups, constitute the number-one domestic 
terrorist threat (Kurzman & Schanzer, 2015). A lens that situates Islamic extremism within a wider 
landscape of other forms of ideologically motivated violence, such as violent white supremacists or militia 
groups, may offer the most comprehensive perspective to address a wide range of public safety issues 
without stigmatizing one group in particular. In addition, integrating counterterrorism programs within a 
larger strategy of public safety and violence prevention may address concerns raised by civil rights 
organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, that CVE programs, in effect, simply ask 
community members to spy on each other, or aim to restrict citizens’ right to freedom of speech.15 This 
point is crucial―efforts to counter extremist propaganda must reach out broadly and guard against 
practices that might alienate Muslim communities.  
                                               
12 See https://twitter.com/sawabcenter?lang=en   
13 See http://www.state.gov/pdcommission/library/177362.htm  
14 Lasse Lindekilde’s (2016) recent chapter addresses the complexities associated with the term radicalization. 
See also Barash and Webel (2014, pp. 71‒98). Addressing right-wing extremism in the Canadian context, 
Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens (2016) emphasize that Canada’s terrorism challenge extends beyond the 
sphere of al-Qa’ida and ISIS.  
15 See https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/cve_briefing_paper_feb_2016.pdf  
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Overall, there is mounting evidence to suggest that, in certain contexts, nongovernment actors 
are best situated to speak credibly. Crucially, the public pronouncements of the Fiqh Council and Islamic 
Supreme Council of Canada (noted above) indicate awareness among U.S. and Canadian Muslim 
communities about the importance of counterterrorism messaging, as well as the influence of source 
credibility. As such, these communicative acts are a proactive and positive response to the threat of 
extremism. Yet there may be other contexts wherein official government communications are credible and 
thus impactful. Government-sponsored counterterrorism communication campaigns may find it useful to 
draw on research from related fields such as disaster communication, emergency management, public 
health, and/or efforts to combat human trafficking to develop models for effective and inclusive 
government communication strategies.16 At a minimum, these efforts might seek to clearly define and 
delineate the purpose of community-based counterterrorism programs to firmly separate prevention 
efforts from law enforcement actions. These programs also underscore the vital need for partnerships 
between government actors and community and private-sector partners. 
 
As efforts evolve, evaluation and assessment are essential. In the end, any successful 
counterterrorism communication program will likely employ multiple tactics as part of a rigorous and 
diverse preventative strategy enacted by both governments and nongovernment organizations, reaching 
both broad-based publics as well as more targeted interventions among those more at risk for recruitment 
and radicalization. As counterterrorism policy analysts Green and Proctor (2016) assert, this approach 
may be viewed as “saturating the marketplace of ideas” through a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy. They write, “strategic communications efforts will only be effective if they are organic, embedded 
in local peer networks, delivered by credible messengers, and articulate a positive vision for society” (p. 
42). To that, we would also add that messages must reach intended audiences, whether a broader public 
or specific at-risk groups. Further, interdisciplinary models are needed to improve how counterterrorism 
messages are effectively targeted to specific audiences.  
 
Returning to our discussion of paradox, outlined at the article’s start, we recognize the practical 
difficulties of government and nongovernmental actors working together to produce credible and effective 
counterterrorism messages. In his conversation with the Canadian imam, the first author discussed the 
challenges of developing programs to meet the needs of at-risk youth. The imam explained that 
community engagement often requires government resources to fund and develop initiatives. He noted, 
however, that government-funded programs are frequently met with suspicion in local communities. 
Nonetheless, he recognized the need for additional federal engagement with representatives of Canada’s 
Muslim community, and resources directed specifically to moderate Muslim organizations throughout the 
country. Official government reframings of its battle against extremist Islamic organizations are important, 
he affirmed, but engagement with Canada’s Muslim population to solidify an Islamic buffer against 
extremist ideologies is a crucial dimension of a comprehensive federal policy. Similarly, working with 
former extremists requires a delicate balance of government awareness and community participation. In 
the United States, where it is illegal to travel to support terrorist organizations, disillusioned individuals 
                                               
16 See http://tcv.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Civic-Approaches-Sept-8-2016-Digital-Release.pdf  
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returning home will by law face severe legal consequence.17 Vidino and Hughes (2015) note that there is a 
great need to develop integrated intervention models, perhaps modeled on programs in Europe, that 
provide an “alternative to prosecution” (p. 2).  
 
We further recognize that this article raises multiple questions surrounding the development of 
effective counterterrorism communications. For example, it may not be politically feasible for a 
government to support an organization that explicitly condemns federal policy as “unjust, [Islamophobic, 
biased, and intolerant]” (Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, 2015, para. 21).18 Within the U.S. context, 
the legal separation between church and state might complicate government efforts to support a Muslim 
nongovernmental organization’s operations (even if such religious programs have uniquely credible 
voices). No single voice or organization represents all Muslims (a fact that affirms the importance of 
engaging target audiences via credible messengers). Community members may be reluctant to report 
concerns to law enforcement authorities, and those that do risk possible retaliation. Finally, some CVE 
programs risk alienating and stigmatizing Muslim communities despite public statements to the contrary. 
These are serious challenges. It is crucial that policy makers and practitioners take steps to genuinely 
collaborate with Muslim communities. Ultimately, efforts to publicize the testimony of formers, and engage 
and support moderate Muslim religious leaders, highlight the promise and consequence of close attention 
to audience and rhetorical principles of credibility. 
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